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What kind of case was Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC?1 The
answer depends on how you set your zoom. At, say, 10x it looks like
a silly case about a freak accident where a tree happens to fall onto
a road at the exact time a car is passing underneath. So viewed,
you might predict that Cline would end up as one of those cases
that collects dust in the dark corners of the tort doctrine, only to
be cited when the next freak tree accident case comes along. But
at, say, 5x, maybe it was not just a case about trees. Maybe it was
a case about any natural condition on one’s property that somehow
causes damage to a driver on an adjoining roadway; so, maybe it
will be relevant in future cases involving rocks and water, as well
as trees. But at the widest aperture, maybe Cline I was not just a
case about natural conditions on one’s land, and maybe it was not
just a case about the relationship between property and adjoining
roadways. Instead, maybe it was about any condition on one’s land
that somehow causes damage somewhere else. If so, maybe Cline I
* Mr. McNew is a partner at MichieHamlett PLLC in Charlottesville,
Virginia, where his practice focuses on appellate advocacy and personal injury.
Special thanks to Ian McElhaney for the invitation to participate in this
Symposium.
1. 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012) [hereinafter Cline I].
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will turn out to be one of the principal cases in modern Virginia
tort doctrine dealing with the legal duties arising from land
ownership.
Cline I started off in the trial court at the 10x zoom. The
briefing and argument focused primarily upon the landowner’s
duty with respect to trees and vegetation. By the time the case got
to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the zoom had widened to around
the 5x mark. Though the Court initially framed the question
presented as being “whether the common law tort principles of this
Commonwealth allow for the recovery of personal injury damages
sustained due to a tree falling from private land onto a vehicle
traveling on a public highway,”2 the rest of the opinion speaks in
more general terms about “natural conditions”3 that affect
travelers on adjoining roadways. In the years since the Cline I
opinion was issued, however, it has taken on a much wider
application to cases that involve neither natural conditions nor
injury to travelers on adjoining roadways.
In his Note, Mr. McElhaney concludes that the Court got it
right in Cline I—that the landowner owes no duty to protect
travelers on adjoining roadways from natural conditions on the
landowner’s property—because the Court also got it right in Cline
II4 when it held that the Commonwealth of Virginia may have that
duty instead.5 At the 10x zoom, that is certainly a defensible
position. If the case is just about natural conditions and roads, then
there is intuitive appeal in saying that they are the
Commonwealth’s roads and it is the Commonwealth’s job to make
them safe for travel, which includes remediating dangerous
conditions on adjoining property. It also makes perfect sense from
a policy standpoint to say that the Commonwealth should shoulder
that burden. I disagree, however, that either of these are reasons
to suggest that the Court got it right in Cline I, primarily because
that conclusion is premised upon viewing the case with too tight of
a lens. Rather, the question—and thus the answer—should have
2. Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 18.
4. Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8,
2016) [hereinafter Cline II].
5. Ian J. McElhaney, Note, If a Tree Falls in a Roadway, Is Anyone Liable?:
Proposing the Duty of Reasonable Care for Virginia’s Road-Maintaining Entities,
76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 507, 552 (2019).
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been framed more broadly so as to provide guidance for a broader
range of fact patterns.
I. The Problem with Cline I, and Why Cline II Isn’t an Answer
The central holding of Cline I is that “[t]he duty owed by
adjoining property owners is to refrain from engaging in any act
that makes the highway more dangerous than in a state of nature
or in the state in which it has been left.”6 There were no allegations
in the plaintiff’s complaint to suggest that the landowner “engaged
in any affirmative act that caused the property adjoining the
highway to be different than in its natural state or different from
the condition in which it was left when the road was built.”7
Instead, this was just an old tree that became visibly dead and
eventually fell—as old trees are wont to do—and so the landowner
owed no duty to the driver on whom the tree fell.
There are several bases to criticize the Cline I majority’s
analysis and conclusion. Many of them are just problems
translating the doctrinal bases of the decision into actual practice.
It may make some rhetorical sense to distinguish between dangers
arising from nature versus dangers arising from man, and thus not
make man liable for the progress of nature, but there are some
bugs in the execution. As such, they are not worthy of focus in this
Response. Rather, for purposes of this writing, the major problem
with Cline I is that it did not go far enough and did not close the
loop.
There was no real debate about whether the dangers posed by
dead trees near public roads were a problem. There are enough
cases involving fallen trees and injured drivers from across the
country that it was hard to argue that this was just a freak incident
with no real risk of recurrence. The question, then, is whose job is
it to fix the problem? In Cline I, the Court conspicuously noted
prior case law to the effect that roads are public, and so it is the
public entity—what Mr. McElhaney refers to as the
“road-maintaining entity”8—that has the duty to “perform a
6.
7.
8.

Cline I, 726 S.E.2d at 18.
Id.
See McElhaney, supra note 5, at 509.
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positive act in the preparation and preservation of a sufficient
traveled way.”9 So that strongly suggested that the answer to the
“whose job” question was, in fact, the road-maintaining entity. But
yet, in the figurative very next breath, the Court stated that while
the Commonwealth has the power to do all acts necessary to
preserve the roadways, “[t]he duty of VDOT or any other entity
responsible for maintaining the safety of the roadway presents a
question not now before us.”10
So, when the dust had settled in Cline I, the Court had ruled
that it was not the private landowner’s job to address the danger
emanating from its land, but did not close the loop and say that it
was instead the Commonwealth’s job. That is a significant gap.
Courts should not be in the business of excusing one actor’s failure
on the grounds that it might be someone else’s job to act unless
they are actually going to say that it is someone else’s job.
Moreover, if it was intended that the Cline I analysis fit within a
larger doctrinal canon, then the analysis must account for other
fact patterns where a danger originating from an owner’s property
injures someone who is not on that property. It is not always going
to be trees and adjoining roads. It may be trees and adjoining land,
or a man-made condition impacting an adjoining roadway. There
are many different fact patterns that could involve a danger
originating from one place injuring people located somewhere else.
So, unless the Court is willing to say that in every situation it will
be the job of the entity that owns the place where the injury occurs
to use reasonable care to prevent the injury, the decision in Cline
I seems short-sighted.
One would assume that the Court would close the loop in Cline
II by confirming that the Commonwealth did in fact have a duty to
take reasonable care to mitigate roadside dangers. One would be
wrong. Cline II was the case against the Commonwealth.11 In
response, the Commonwealth took the position that it too owed no
duty to Mr. Cline, and that in any event there was no legally
9. Cline I, 726 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 646 (Va.
1927)). This echoed arguments made by Dunlora in its briefing that the Court did
not need to impose a duty on the adjoining landowner because the Commonwealth
already had a duty to mitigate dangerous conditions along its roads.
10. Id. at 18 n.6.
11. Cline v. Commonwealth, No. 151037, 2016 WL 4721393 (Va. Sept. 8,
2016).
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enforceable duty because of the Commonwealth’s sovereign
immunity. Given the Court’s nod toward the Commonwealth’s
obligation to maintain the road in Cline I, it should have been a
fait accompli that the Court would reject the Commonwealth’s
position in Cline II. But instead, the Court decided that it need not
decide whether the Commonwealth owed such a duty in the first
instance.12 Instead, because the plaintiff had alleged that the
Commonwealth had, in fact, inspected the trees along the roadway
in question, the Court ruled that, under the facts alleged, the
Commonwealth had assumed a duty in this particular
circumstance.13 The Court thus avoided having to confront the
question of whether, in light of the existence of sovereign
immunity, it actually could impose such a duty on the
Commonwealth ab initio.
Whereas Cline I decided the issue for all tree-falling-in-road
cases, Cline II was limited to the facts of this particular case. Thus,
even after Cline II, there is no Virginia authority for the
proposition that anyone has the duty in the first instance to
mitigate roadside dangers. That is a bad state of affairs for
Virginia drivers, and it is born from the Court’s reticence to
actually close the loop. It also provides no guidance for other fact
patterns where a danger originates from one place and injures
someone somewhere else.
II. Virginia Comes Out of the Trees, Into the Forest.
Since Cline I, the Supreme Court of Virginia has confronted
two other situations when a danger originated from an owner’s
property but injured someone somewhere else. In both situations,
the Court ruled (correctly) that it was the duty of the owner from
whose property the danger originated to mitigate the danger. In
RGR, LLC v. Settle,14 the owner of a lumber yard had placed a
12. Id. at *1 (“We have not decided, and need not do so in this case, whether
an easement holder owes a duty to a third party injured by a dangerous condition
arising from property over which an easement runs.”).
13. See id. at *2 (noting that Cline’s “allegations are sufficient to give rise to
a cause of action against the Commonwealth on a theory it assumed a duty by
undertaking the inspection and remediation of dangerous conditions on the rightof-way”).
14. 764 S.E.2d 8, 12 (Va. 2014).

558

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553 (2019)

stack of lumber at the edge of its property in a way that obstructed
the view of drivers on an adjoining private roadway as they crossed
a railroad track. When a train killed a driver trying to cross the
tracks, the driver’s estate sued the lumber yard, claiming that the
lumber yard had created the danger—the view obstruction—that
caused the incident to happen. The lumber yard responded much
like the defendant in Cline I, by claiming it owed no duty to prevent
injury that did not occur on its property, even if the danger
originated from its property.15 Instead, according to the lumber
yard, the duty rested with the railroad to make sure that its tracks
and right-of-way were clear of obstruction. Indeed, there were
striking similarities between these facts and those in Cline I: a
driver on a roadway was injured by a danger originating from
adjoining property. The only difference was the danger—tree
versus stack of lumber. This, according to the Court, made all the
difference. Distinguishing Cline I on the basis that the danger
there was a natural condition, the Court ruled that the lumber
yard did have a duty to those off its premises because the danger
was man-made rather than nature-made.16
Quisenberry v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.17 also involved a
situation in which a danger originating from one place injured
someone somewhere else, and again the question is whether the
premises owner owed a duty to the injured party.18 However,
unlike Cline I and RGR, the injured person was not someone
driving on an adjoining roadway. The injured person was not even
someone anywhere close to the defendant’s property. Instead, the
defendant was a shipyard that had used asbestos on its premises,
which had then traveled off-premises on the body and clothes of
shipyard employees. When those employees went home, their
family members were exposed to asbestos, and some of them, like
Mrs. Quisenberry, ended up contracting a deadly cancer that is
caused by asbestos exposure. Just like the defendants in Cline I
and RGR, the shipyard argued that it had no duty to those who
were strangers to its business and who were not injured on its
premises. And just as it did in RGR, the Court rejected this
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 17–18.
818 S.E.2d 805 (Va. 2018).
Id. at 807.

IN SEARCH OF A UNIFIED THEORY

559

argument. Because the danger was man-made rather than
naturally occurring, the Court ruled that the owner of the
premises, the shipyard, owed a duty to prevent that danger from
injuring people off-premises, even if those people were miles and
miles away.19
III. The Tie That Binds
RGR and Quisenberry isolate the damage caused by the Cline
decisions by maintaining and enforcing the distinction between
naturally occurring dangers and man-made dangers. But taken
together, these three cases also demonstrate that there are
numerous fact patterns in which a danger originating from one
place injures someone somewhere else, and that the only constant
throughout all of these fact patterns is the originating landowner.
There will not always be someone else whose job it might be to
mitigate the danger, or against whom a court can enforce that
duty. And that is why it is not sufficient to say that, in the tree
versus road situation, the duty should fall on the road-maintaining
entity. As a policy matter, it makes perfect sense. But as a legal
matter, courts might not be able or willing to enforce that duty
against the road-maintaining entity. Instead, rather than
allocating the burden on the basis of a distinction between whether
a danger is man-made or naturally occurring, the better, more
consistent approach would be to place the burden on the landowner
in all circumstances to prevent dangers that originate on the
landowner’s own property. That is the only way to have doctrinal
consistency, and to ensure that there will always be someone
responsible for preventing reasonably foreseeable harm.

19.

Id. at 814.

